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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
Ac1rnow.r.1'DGYtN'.l.'.-UND!lR A S'.l.'ATU'.l.'E REGuI.A'.l.'ING AcKNOWI.EDGMltN'.1.'S BY
MARRIJ;;D WoMr:N-AN ExAMINA'.l.'ION MADt OVllR TuU:PHONt xs NO'.!.' Sui:.111CIEN'.l.'.-In a question involving the validity of a mortgage deed, it appeared
that the acknowledgment of a Mrs. Bertholf had been taken by mean& of telephone. The court, in construing the Idaho statute regulating acknowledgments of married women, held that the clear intent of the statute was that
all acknowledgments should be taken !n person before the magistrate, and
any attempted acknowledgment not taken in person, though correct in form
and without suspicion of fraud, was void, being beyond the power of the
officer. Myers v. Eby (Idaho, 1920), 193 Pac. 77.
That so common a meth~ of taking acknowledgments should be found
void is perhaps startling, yet seems in entire accord with the great weight of
authority. Privy examinations .of married women taken by telephone have
generally been held invalid. Roach v. Francisco, 138 Tenn. 357, 197 S. W.
1099, refuses to allow such a practice upon the general basis that their statute
had not been passed at the time of the inauguration of telephones, and
acknowledgments by such means could not have been within the purview of
the legislature? Wester v. Hurt,-·-· Tenn.--, 130 S. W. 1099, decides
against suclt a practice on the ground that judicial determination has decided
that such examinations must be personal. The chief authority for a different view is Banning v. Banning, 8o Cal. 2j'I, 13 Am. St. Rep. 156, where the
court states the unmistakable view that an acknowledgment made by telephone may be valid and the facts in it may not be impeached so long as
there are no errors in form and no evidence of fraud is produced. Tbe
statute in ·that case and that in the principal case are similar, and there is
no more basis for regarding the necessity for personal appearance greater
in one case than in the other because of the mere wording of the statutes.
Although in Banning v. Banning the wife is attempting to avoid the deed
on the ground that acknowledgment was made over the telephone, the court
does not put its decision upon the basis of estoppel, but takes the stand that
such an acknowledgment is sufficient to satisfy the statute. While such a
practice might prove expeditious and is already much used, the dangers of
such a course appe'ar in S1111ivan v. First Nat. Bank, 37 Te.~. Civ. App. 228,
where the court says that the safeguards given in the requirement of acknowledgment lie in the fact that the officer knows the person making the oath
and stating the deed to be his own. If the officer is forced to receive the
acknowledgment by telephone, in very few cases he is in a position to
identify the speaker and must accept the statement of the speaker as to his
identity. Thus, when the question later arises as to whether the one whose
name was used in the deed made the aknowledgment, there is no means of
determining whether the identity of the one whose name was used in the
acknowledgment is the same as the one using the telephone to secure the
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acknowledgment. The court in the principal case seems justified in construing the statute so as to secure better mean"s of obtaining satisfactory
evidence that the one making the acknowledgment is the same person
described in the instrument.
AuTOMOBII;i>s-CoNTRIBUTORY N£GLIGI;NCS oF TH:£ Gui>sT IN FAILING To

wARN THE DIUVtR OF 1MP:£NDING DANG:£R.-The plaintiff was riding as a guest
in the defendant's automobile. The windshield of the car was frosted so that
neither was able to see that a crossing was blocked by a standing train until
too late to avoid collision. The plaintiff ·had warned the defendant of the
excessive speed' at which he was driving, but testified that he did not know
whether or not the defendant had heard his protest. The plaintiff knew the
position of the railroad crossing, but did not remonstrate with the defendant
in regard to the manner in which he was approaching it. Held, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Failure·
on the part of the guest to see that the driver is keeping a proper lookout
or to protest the negligent manner in which the car is being driven will bar
a recovery from the driver in case of injury. Howe v. Corey (Wis., 1920),
I79 N. W. 79I.
The driver of an automobile owes a duty to his invited guest to e.'Cercise
ordinary care not to increase the danger ordinarily incid'ent to driving; and
if he fails to exercise such duty he is liable for the injury proximately
resulting. Perkins v. Gallowas, Ig8 Ala. 658, affirming I94 Ala. ,265; Beard
v. Klusmeier, I58 Ky. 153- And it seems that the guest, likewise, owes a
duty to use reasonable care for his own safety. Pe11n. Ry. v. Henderson,
I79 Fed. 577. But what does this duty require of the guest? The Indiana
court has held that it is not necessary for him to jump out of the car. Union
Traction Co. v. Love, 18o Ind. 442. Nor is he required to ask permission to
get out. Tim1ey v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, I55 Mo. App. 5I3. And
the Rhode Island court does not even require the guest to protest when the
car is being driven at an excessive speed. Herman v. Rhode Island Co., ;36
R. I. 447. However, the principal case would seem to place .a burden. upon
the guest not only of protesting an excessive rate of speed but also cf continuing to protest until he is certain that his complaints have come to the
knowledge of the driver. Furthermore, he must remonstrate with the driver
in regard to the manner in which each new situation of danger is approached
in order not to assume the risk of possible resulting injury. It appears to
the writer that such a rule is quite contrary to the dictates of sound reason
and common experience. It, in effect, places a burden upon the guest of
electing between becoming a "back seat driver" or his own insurer against
all the perils encountered during the drive.
CARRI£RS-LIA1lILI'l'Y FOR Los'!' BAGGAG£-PASSENG:£R FROM ADJACENT FOREIGN CouNTRY.-The plaintiff was on a journey from Canada to El Paso,
Texas, traveling on a coupon ticket to El Paso and return, with a stop-over
privilege of which she availed herself at San Antonio. She checked her
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trunk from there to El Paso, on which trip it was lost. When she purchased
her ticket at Timmins, Ontario, she was not told of any limitation of the
car·rier's liability, and it does not appear that any notice appeared on the
ticket. The company claims that she was on an interstate journey, and that
since it had duly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and published a tariff limiting liability to $100 unless passenger declared a higher
value and paid excess charges, it is liable only for that amount. The plaintiff
sued in a Texas court for the full value, which was $soo. The Texas Court
of Appeals allowed full recovery. Held, that she is entitled only to $100.
Galveston,, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railwa.~ Co. v. Woodbury (U. S.
Supreme Court, Dec. 13, 1920).
For history of the development of the right of a carrier to limit liability,
see Law Review articles cited in 17 MICH. L. Ri;;v. 183. The Act to Regulate
Commerce applies to "passengers and property" expressly in three situations :
where the passenger is traveling from one state to another, where he is traveling f.rom a point in the United States to another point in: the United States
through a foreign country, and where he is traveling from a point in the
United States to an adjacent foreign country. Before the Clirmack Amend~
ment was passed it had been held that a commoll: carrier could contract to
exempt himself from all liability except for losses caused by his own negligence. R. Cq. v. Lockwood, 17 WalL 357. And an agreement as to valuation
of property is valid, and carrier's liability is restricted to that value, not by
virtue of a contract, but by estoppel. Hart v. Penn. Rd., u2 U. S. 331. It
was held in Matter of Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. R 550, that the Hepburn
Act with the Carmack Amendment made carriers liable for losses caused
by them, thus stipulating that the carrier could not stipulate to exempt himself from liability for losses due to his OWill negligence; and that although
he could limit recovery to an honestly agreed valuation, even where the loss
was due to his own negligence, Hart v. Penn. Rd., supra, yet where the valuation was only an arbitrary attempt to limit recovery to a specified amount,
regardless of value,. "the law will not countenance so obvious a subterfuge.'·
The Act superseded all state legislation on the subject, leaving the shipper
only the rights he had had under existing Federal laws. Adams E.~press Co.
v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491. Attempts to limit liability for losses due to negligence are void (Boston & Maine Rd. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439), but the utmost
freedom in limiting liability to an agreed valuation has been allowed, holding ·
the shipper to the agreed valuation, where both shipper and carrier know
that it bears no relation to the real value, even though loss is due to carrier's
negligence. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 236 U. S. 278. 'fhe Carmack
Amendment applies to baggage. Boston & Maine R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S.
97. The Cummins Amendntent, 38 S'l'A'l'. ng6, passed shortly after the Pierce
case, supra, was decided, applied to baggage, but as amended, 39 S'l'A'l'. 441,
it does not, as is said in the principal case, Culbreth v. Martin, 103 S. E. 374
Justice Brand'ei.s, in his opinion in the principal case, follows Boston & Maine
R. v. Hooker, supra, which holds that although the passenger did not know
of the limitation of liability in the tariffs of the carrier filed with the Inter-
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state Commerce Commission, yet if such stipttlation in the tariffs limits liability for loss of baggage to $roo if no other valuation· is declared, and the
regulations are observed, and the passenger makes no declaration, he cannot
recover more than the $100. However, the dissenting opinion by Justice
Pitney, in: which he says that the formula of rates filed does not constitute
a binding contract without the consent of the passenger or shipper, and that
there is no basis for estoppel, as in the Hart case, si1pra, seems better law.
Homer v. Railroad, 42 Utah, IS; St. Lcuis, I. M. & S. Ry. CO". v. Faulkner,
III Ark. 430. In Ferris v. Mimieapoli; & St. L. Ry. Co., I73 N. W. 178, in
a baggage cas-e arising under a state statute similar to the Hepburn Act, it
was likewise held that there must be a valid contract fairly assented to by
the passenger, and that the contract must be a reasonable limitation, the
burden of proof being on the carrier to prove the contract. At any rate, to
apply the result of the decisions to one traveling from Canada is carrying a
bad thing too far. And to say that the Act meant to include travelers from
an adjacent foreign country, as well as those to such country, it is submitted,
is judicial legislation. True, in lntematio11al Paper Co. v. D. & H. Co., 33
I. C. C. ZJO, as Justice Brandeis says, the Commission placed that construction on the Act, but that controversy concerned a difference in rates between
Canada and the United States, and the Commission held that it had authority
over all carriers within the limits of the United States, without regard to
direction of shipments. Yet it held the rate established by the Canadian
Commission to be reasonable, and that comity demanded that it be not
changed. T. & P. Ry. Co. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 197, cited, says, in a dictum,
that the Act was meant to apply to the whole field of commerce except intrastate, but this was not necessary to the decision. But perhaps this decision,
like that in the Pierce case, supra, will agitate better legislation on this matter.
CONSTITUTIONAL LA.w-CoNCURRF;NT PowER UNDER TP.:E EilaITn:NTH
A:r.n:NDYENT.-Habeas corpus proc~dings against sheriff for detaining plaintiff, who was arrested for violating the prohibition law of the state. Plaintiff
maintains that the Volstead Act superseded and abrogated all state laws on
the subject, and hence there was no state law in existence. Held, the power
of ~he state is equal to that of Congress in passing laws on this subject, so
the state law was not abrogated. Jones v. Hicks (Georgia, 1920), 104 S.
E. 771.
For a discussion of the meaning of "concurrent power" under the Eighteenth Amendment., see 19 MICH. L. Rl;v. 329. The opinion in the principal
case goes so far as to say that Congressional legislation cannot interfere
with the enactment of any future legislation by the states to enforce prohibition. This gives to Congress and the states equal power. This suggests
the analogy of concurrent jurisdiction exercised by states over the waters
of a river forming the boundary between them. See Wedding v. Meyler,
192 U. S. 573; Neilson v. Oregon, 212 U. S. ~ns; supra, p. 331. But Justice
White, in Rhode lsla11d v. Palmer, 40 Sup. Ct. 486, said that the object of
the second section of the amendment was to adjust the matter to our dual
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system of government. To hold that Congress and the states have equal
power here would change the dual system. In Gibbons v. Ogdm, 9 Wheat. 1,
at p. 2u, Chief Justice Marshall said that state laws enacted by the states in
the e;x:ercise of their acknowledged sovereignty, not transcending their powers,
must give way to laws passed by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution
where contrary to them, for the Acts of Congress are supreme. See I¥isco11.sfo v. Duluth, g6 U. S. 379. In Keller v. U. S., 213 U. S. rJS, which held that
an Act of Congress was invalid because it encroached upon the police power
of the state, Justice Brewer says, at p. I45: "Doubtless it not infrequently
happens that the same act may be referable to the power of the state as wetl
as to that of Congress. If there be collision in such cases the supericr
authority of Congress prevails." The principal case relies on E:r parte
Guerra, no At!. 224. In that case the plaintiff, convicted under a state prohibition law, maintained that the war-time Prohibition Act of Congress
superseded all state legislation, but it was held that Congress acted under
valid war power and the state under a valid exercise of its police pow:er, .and
that the state statute does not yield to that of Congress unless its enforcement conflicts with the Acts of Congress. It was, in that case, held not to
conflict. It is submitted that any proper adjustment to our dual system of
government requires the state statute to yield in case of manifest repugnance
to the Act of Congress. See City of Shreveport v. Marx (La., I920), 86
So. 002.
.
CoNSTITUTION.AI, LAw-Dus Prulcsss-Exs:r.i:PT10N oF FAR:r.i:r.a FRoM FooD

Lsvn AC'r.-Under section four of the Lever Act it is made
unlawful for persons to perform any acts lmowingly in an attempt to enhance
prices, or prevent production, to cripple transportation of necessaries, or to
attempt to acquire a monopoly of such necessaries, and it is also made punishable by fine or imprisonment for persons to combine or conspire to accomplish such ends. It is also provided that this section. shall not apply to
farmers or assoc.iations of farmers, and upon the basis that this was a classification without a reasonable basis it was held that this section of the Act
was irwalid. U.S. v, Yount (D. C., W. I?., Pa., I920), 267 Fed. Rep. 861.
It is unquestioned that the separate states in the exercise of their police
powers may subject the citizen to such restraint, to be enforced by ·reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. To do
this, classification of the differe~t subjects or persons to be regulated is
always permissible so long as the classification rests upon some difference
bearing a reasonable and just relation to the subject matter in respect to
which the classification is proposed. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184
U. S. 540, 4) L. Ed. 679. Yet this classification may not be arbitrary and
without reasonable basis. The court in the principal case, fotlowing the
precedent in the Connolly case, takes the stand that since the purpose of the
act is to prevent the hoarding, the monopolizing, the manipulation of necessaries so as to raise prices and to allow profiteering, the exemption of the
CoNTROL UNDSR
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farmer was omitting a class subject to the same temptations to combine for
these purposes as any other class, and thus there was no reasonable basis for
such a discrimination. Yet this stand is subject to the criticisms that appear
in Mr. Justice McKenna's dissenting opinion in that case, in which he takes
the view that the legislature has a wide range of discretion in the matter of
classification, and that there is no evidence in the case to show that there
was not a valid reason for legislating against combinations in the hands of
traders, persons, and corporations, and exempting producers. The American
Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 8g, 21 Sup. Ct. 43, seems authority for
such a classification, despite the fact -that it is distinguished in the Connolly
case, for, in the Sugar Refi1iing Company case a certain tax is imposed upon
the manufacturers of sugar and not upon the growers of that article, while
in the principal case certain conduct is merely penalized as to certain classes
in which farmers and associations of farmers are not included.· ·Other
grounds for regarding this a supportable classification appear in the fact
that the aim of the Lever Act as a whole was to aid the production of necessities. That the legislature saw fit to exempt farmers from the section punishing monopolies, combinations in restraint of transportation, profiteering,
etc., indicates that the legislators evidently considered that the danger of
such evils was not so great in the case of this particular class of producers
and that they considered that the need for farm product5' was so great as to
warrant encouraging farmers to the extent of allowing them a free hand in
the means that they might take to strengthen their position. Certainly there
are distinct differences in the situation of the farming class, and it seems
that the legislature might be left to determine the relation of these differences to the acts declared invalid. In analogous case5' similar exemptions
have not been regarded as arbitrary, though class distinctions are scarcely as
marked as in the principal case. In State v. McKay, 137 Tenn. 28o, 193 S.
W. 99, certain restrictions placed upon the seller of seeds were not applied
to the farmer vendor in certain kinds of sales, and this was held not a violation of the "equal protection" clause of the Constitution because such sales
were probably less open to the practice of deception. Whether the dangers
of combines and conspiracies on the part of farmers to raise prices are proportionately more in the principal case than danger of deception in the case
just mentioned seems doubtful. Jn St. John v. New York, 201 U. S. 518, 30
Sup. Ct. 443, the non-producing vendor of milk was made liable "by statute
to certain fines and penalties to which the producing vendor was not liable
on a showing that the milk was in the same condition as at the time when
it had left the herd. Whether there is a more valid distinction between sttch
classes and those established by the Lever act in the present case is open to
question.
CoNS'rlTUTIONAL LAw-Pow!R oii L!GlSLA'l'URE ro REGULA'l'E REN'l'AL

RATES.-In an action by a landlord to recover possession the tenant relied
upon the Ball Rent Law passed by Congress for the regulation of the busi-
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ness 'of renting property in the District of Columbia. Held, that the Rent
Law was invalid, inasmuch as there is no devotion of rented property to a
''public use." Hfrsh v. Block (C. C. A., D. C., 1920), 267 Fed. 614.
In the exercise of its police power a state may regulate rates charged in
businesses "affected with a public interest." .Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. u3:
Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391;
German Alli<mce Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 38g. Congress possesses
all the police power within the Distr-ict of Columbia that a state legislature
has within its state. Washington Terminal Co. v. District of Columbia, 36
App. D. C. 186, 191; District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 147, 149. The
majority of the court in the principal case refused to differentiate between
a "public interest" and: a "public use," and explained .Munn v. Illinois, supra,
as based upon the fact that the owner of the grain elevator in that case had
devoted it to a public use in handling gra!n for the public generally. The
dissenting opinion in the principal case points out that the argument was
advanced in the Munn case and its' succes5or5' that the owne;s of.the property
in question were private individuals, doing a private busines~ ·without any
privilege or monopoly granted to them by the state; yet it was held that their
property was affected with a "public interest." Against these considerations
"tlte court opposed the ever existing police power in government and its
necessary exercise for the public good, and d·ectared its entire accommodation to the limitations of the Constitution." German Alliance Insurance Co.
v. Lewis, supra. In the case last mentioned ·the business of fire insurance
was held to be affected with a "public interest" and subject to regulation.
See 28 HARv. L. Rtv. 84 for a discussion of this case. The idea that a
"public interest" is synonymous with a "public use" has been advocated in
every case from Munn v. Illinois to the German Alliance case, and has found
favor only in the dissenting opinions. In the exercise of the war-power
Congress regulated prices of necessaries, yet even the war-power can touch
only "business affected with a public interest," and clearly there was no devotion of property to a "public use." See Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 266 Fed.
785. Whether or not Congress is justified' in declaring the rent business
affected with a public interest under the conditions prevailing in the District
of Columbia, it seems clear that the statute cannot be disposed of by a conclusion that there is no "public use"' involved. For a more extended discussion as to the scope of the phrase "businesses affected with a public interest,"
see 19 MICH. L. IU:v. 74CoNSTlTUTlONAL LAW-!U:PtAL OF TAX EXEMPTION AS IMPAIRMENT OF

CoNTRAcT.-Under a New York statute of 1853 (Laws of 1853, c. 462) the
relator's property was exempt from taxation above the value of $30,000.
This statute was repealed. by an act of 1909 (Acts of 1909, c. 201), and thereafter the assessors of the City of Troy placed a value of one million dollars
upon the relator's property, upon which valuation city taxes were assessed.
In an action to set aside the taxes so assessed, the relator claims that the
:epeal of the act of 1853 effected an impairment of his contract, embodied
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in that act, contrary to the contract clause of the Federal Constitution (Art.
I, § 10). Held, assessment should be sustained. People e:r rel. Troy Union
Ry. Co. v. Mealy et al. (1920), 4I Sup. Ct. Rep. 17.
The courts are not inclined to view claims for exemption from taxation
favorably. Tucker v. Ferguson, 8g U. S. 527. And will not find a contract
in a statute granting such exemption unless there is quid pro quo. Ry. Co.
v. Supervisors, 93 U. S. 5g6. To the contrary, where it appears that the
party exempted furnished no consideration, the exemption is simply a promise of a gratuity, 511ontaneously made, and subjest to repeal at the pleasure
of the legislature. Christ Church v. Phila. County, 65 U. S. 300. Mere action.
in reliance upon the statute will not be held good consideration. Ry. Co. v.
Powers, I9I U. S. 379. But even where a consideration has been given, an
express reservation of power to repeal, in the act itself or in the state constitution, will give the legislature the right to withdraw the privilege at will.
Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13; Calder v. Michigan, 218 U. S. 59I.
A grant of privileges coµtained in a corporate charter stands upon a somewhat different footing. In such a case the precedent of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, precludes the court from holding that a grant
of exemption is 11ud11m pactmn. Owensboro v. Telephone Co., 230 U. S. 58.
The decision in the principal case rests upon a solid foundation in that the
relator furnished no consideration for the exemption, and furthermore, that
the right of repeal was reserved in Art. VIII, § I of the Constitution of
New York.
CRIMINAL LAW-WAIV£R oF CoNFRONTATION.-During the progress of
the defendant's trial on the charge of rape the state offered in evidence,
without objection on the part of the accused: or his counsel, the testimony
of the prosecutrix as taken before the grand jury. Counsel for the state
and for the defendant were present in the grand jury room when the evidence was given, and both agreed to the use of the testimony at the trial.
Held, the defendant had waived his constitutional right to be confronted by
the witness, notwithstanding the fact that the stipulation had been made by
an attorney appointed by the court to represent the accused. Denson v.
State (Ga., 1920). 104 S. E. 78o.
- By the federal. constitution and the constitutions of most of the states,
in a criminal proceeding the accused has a -right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. I WIGMORE Ev., Sec. I3g6. The authorities are practically uniform on the proposition that this right of confrontation. is a personal privilege which the accused can waive. Smith v. State, I45 Wis. 612,
I30 N. W. 46!; State v. Williford, III Mo. App. 668, 86 S. W. 570; 2 BISHOP,
NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [2d Ed.], Sec. I205; 16 C. J. 840. The waiver
may be either by express consent, as where the accused agrees to the reading
oi depositions taken elsewhere; by failure to assert the right in time; or by
conduct inconsistent with a purpose to insist on it. State v. Mitchell, ng N.
C. 874, 25 S. E. 873; CHAMBERLAYNE, Ev., Sec. 462. According to the great
weight of authority an express agreement or stipulation made by counsel for
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, an accused, in reference to a waiver of the right of confrontation, has the
same effect as if made by the defendant himself. Rosenbaum v. State, 33
Ala. 354. And as Cooley, J., pointed out in People v. Murray, 52 Mich. 288,
17 N. W. 843, it makes no difference whether the stipulation is made by
counsel employed by the accused or by counsel appointed by the court for
the accused. Texas alone seems to hold that the waiver, to be binding, must
be made by the accused himself. Allen v. State, 16 Tex. App. 237. The
latter tribunal seemingly forgets that the attorney is the accused's personal
representative at the trial and acts for him; it also overlooks the fact that
even though the accused may have had no voice in the selection of the
appointed counsel, he could have objected in due time to the stipulation and
waiver. In the instant case he offered no objection until after the verdict
was rendered against him. Logically, the accused here can hardly complain,
considering the further fact that his counsel had cross-examined the witness
whose testimony was read at the trial. "The main and essential purpose of
confrontation,is to secure the opportunity of cross-examination." 2 W1cMO~, Ev., Sec. 1395, This is the' primary right the constitutional provision
mainly guarantees; and once this opportu~ity and nght are had.and enjoyed
by the accused he cannot claim :that he was denied due process of law.
. Dr:r:ns-Dr:r.IV£RY-GRAN'.l'OR Rr:'.l'AINlNG Possr:ss10N.-The defendants
claimed land under an instrument, signed, sealed and acknowledged by the
grantor. The latter, during his life, retained possession of the land and of
the instrument; he gave the latter to no one at any time, and he made no
declarations regarding it, its existence being unknown until after his death,
when it was found among his papers. In an action by the heirs of the
grantor for partition, it was held that there had been no valid delivery of the
instrument. Mt1mpower v. Castle (Sup. Ct. App., Va., 1920), 104 S. E. 7o6.
The defendants claimed under an instrument, signed, sealed and acknowledged by ·the grantor (testator), who in his will spoke of land which he
had "deeded" to the defendant, and said that the deed would be found with
the will. Apparently, the deed was signed: and acknowledged some time
after the will was made, for it bore a later date than the will. After the
testator's death it was found, signed and acknowledged, along with the will.
In a suit by two grandchildren of the testator ,for partition, it was held that
there had been a valid delivery of the deed. Payne v. Payne (Sup. Ct. App.,
Va., 1920), 104 S. E. 712.
Delivery of a deed, as the court points out, is essentially a matter of
intention on the part of the grantor to consummate the transaction as far as
he is concerned'; i. e., to have the instrument operate presently as a conveyance. The cases above, .recognizing that manual transfer of possession is
unnecessary, nevertheless hold that even where an instrument is signed,
sealed, and acknowledged there must be some other circumstance or word
or act of the grantor showing an intention on his part to have the instrument operate presently as a conveyance ini order to constitute a valid delivery.
The weight of authority supports this doctrine that delivery is an affirmative
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act, as essential to the validity of the deed as the signing or sealing, and
being a distinct . requisite for validity, must be proved by the one claiming
under the instrument. Fain v. Smith, 14 Ore. 82, 58 Am. Rep. 281; Fishe,.
v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416; Boyd v. Slayback, 63 Cal. 493. In the second: case, the
language used by the testator in his will ·regarding the deed,·and his subsequent action in acknowledging the deed and placing it with his wj\l were
.considered as clearly indicating his intention to make it then operative as
his deed. For a very similar case see Toms v. Owen, 52 Fed. 417. See also
17 MICH. L. ruv. 344 and references given there. There are misleading statements in certain cases cited in Payne v. Payne, supra, to the effect that the
signing, sealing and acknowledging of a voluntary conveyance raise a prima
facie presumption of its delivery. The language, however, was unnecessary
to the decision of the cases cited and is impossible to reconcile with elementary
principles of the law as to delivery.
EQUITY-UNCLEAN HANDS.-Plaintiff was a corporation gtvmg chiropractic lessons by mail, and had built up its business by false, misleading,
and fraudulent advertising. Defendant, a former president of the plaintiff
company, started a rival institution and took with him a list of plaintiff's
present and prospective pupils, and sent letters to them derogatory to plaintiff, and calculated to draw its pupils away. The defendant built up his business by the same kind of fraudulent advertising. Plaintiff asked for an
injunction to restrain defendant from sending out any more such letters.
Held, the plaintiff's unclean: hands preclude equity from giving the relief
asked. A111erica1i University v. Wood, 128 N. E. 330 (Ill., 1920).
The court in the principal case lays down the broad proposition that
equity will not aid a litigant in the promotion of a fraud on the public,
although his wrong did not affect the private rights ,of the defend'ant, and
had no necessary connection with defendant's wrong-doing, citing Primeau
v. Gra1ifield, 193 Fed. 9u, in which, there being a suit to declare a trust and
for an accounting between plaintiff and defendant, who were engaged in a
fraudulent joint enterprise for the sale of worthless mining stock to the
public, the court dismissed the bill, holding the plaintiff had not come into
~ourt with clean hands·. The Trade Mark or Trade Name cases, 4 A. L. R:
32, .note, in which plaintiff asks for an injunction to restrain an infringement, are the most numerous and important type in which the courts have
applied the doctrine of unclean hands, as in Worden v. Califoniia Fig Syrup
Co., 187 U. S. 516, where an injunction restraining an infringement on the
trade name, "Syrup of Figs," was refused, the court holding that the name
was a fraud: on the public, as the product contained no fig syrup, but was
merely an extract of senna, and dismissed the bill because of the plaintiff's
unclean hands. In Memphis Keeley Institute v. Leslie E. Keeley Co., 155
Fed. g64, plaintiff asked an injunction. to restrain defendants from administering their remedies, and to cancel the contract. The court found that the
so-called "Gold Cure" contained no gold, although the sale of the medicine
had been built up by representations to that effect, and held that as this
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advertising amounted to a fraud on the public, equity would not interfere
where plaintiff's hands were unclean. In both this case and the principal
one the rule that the misrepresentation must be directly connected with the
subject matter of the suit (Shaver v. Heller, 1o8 Fed. 821, 834), was considered inapplicable. In Coca Cola Co. v. Koke Co. (U. S S. Ct., October term,
1920), 41 Sup. Ct. u3, the court sustained an injunction against an infringement of the name "Coca Cola," in spite of the objection that the name was a
deceit on the public. In reversing the conclusion in 255 Fed. 894, and modifying and affirming the holding in 235 Fed. 4o8, the court decided that there was
no fraudulent advertising in the case, and that although the name was derived
from a derivative of cocaine, and now, as a matter of fact, the drink contained no cocaine, yet the public asked for the beverage itself, and not for
a drink with the expectation of getting cocaine in it. From a consideration
of these cases it would seem that the Illinois court in its broad application
of the rule was justified in principle, although none of the cases considered
has· stated or applied it so liberally.
EvmtNct-TSSTIHONY oF THF. Dtc:i;AsF.D G1vtN AFTER THE Tun~ oF THI!
ACCIDENT IS ADMISSmr.:io: AS p AR't OF Rr:s GssTA:io:.-Statements made by the
deceased after being shot that the defendant had attacked and robbed him,
though made some time after the a~cident, held admissible as part of the
res gestae, since there had been no opportunity to deliberate on the effect
of the words. Solice v. State (Ariz., 1920), 193 Pac. 19.
The doctrin~ of res gestae, as a basis for the admission of evidence, may
be summarized, in a limited sense, as the practice of admitting the entire
collection of primary facts constituting the immediate and necessary field
of judicial inquiry in the particular case. This may involve the admission
of declarations and statements that might otherwise be classed as hearsay
evidence, even though these statements may not have occurred at the time
or at the place of the principal occurrence. A further inquiry into the exact
nature of the doctrine of res gestae reveals the fact that it has been applied
as a loose name covering several more definite rules fer admitting evidence,
the more important of which are spontaneous exclamations or statements,
statements admissible under the verbal act doctrine, statements showing mental condition, and statements admissible as part of the issue- under the pl~d
ings, and others. This confusion of several distinct bases for the admission
of evidence has in many cases led to confusion of the elements necessary
for the admission of evidence of the type involved in the principal case,
and more technically known as spontaneous exclamations. Spontaneous
exclamations, as an exception to the hearsay rule, are admissible when,
because of the elemenll: of the time of making such exclamations and the
circumstances of making, it is evidi:nt that the words have been emitted
spontaneously and without previous reflection on their effect. Untrustworthiness being the basis of the hearsay rule, it is the spontaneity of this particular form of res gestae that insures their truth and forms the basis of the
exception. Hence the elements necessary for the presence of this guaranty
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seem to be a startling occasion, a statement made before there is time for
fabrication, the content of which relates to the circumstances of the occurrence. A number of courts in treating matters coming distinctly under the
head of spontaneous utteram:es of this kind have confused the requirements
with those of other forms of res gestae, and particularly with those of verbal·
acts. The elements of a verbal act are either that the words must be a
part of the issue under the substantive law involved or must be such as to
give a certain legal significance to the principal occurrence, and such statements have generally been held only to be admissible if those of the actor
and if precisely contemporaneous in time with the principal act. Courts,
then, in confusing these two classes of evidence have called statements made
after the time of the accident and not in exclamatory form "narrative," and
exclude such statements on the basis that they are not a part of, contemporaneous with, or having a particular bearing on the principal act, without
considering that the real necessity is that such statements must merely be
made under such circumstances as to guarantee their truthfulness. In Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 935, the court considers that the
mere fact that the statement was in narrative form sufficient reason for
excluding it. Other such cases are: Vicksburg M. R. Co. v. O'Brien, ug
U. S. 99; Dampier v. Lewis, 131 Mich. 144; Clark v. Electrical Suppl)• Co.,
72 Mo. App. 5o6; Ruschenberg v. So. Blee. R. Co., 161 Mo. 70, 6I S. W. 626.
fo Butler v. M. Ry. Co., 143 N. Y. 417, 38 N. E. 454. the court does not seem
to consider spontaneous utterance as a basis for the admission of evidence,
but stated that statements were admissible only when unfolding the character or quality of the principal act. Williums v. So. Pac. Co., 133 Cal. 550,
goes so far as to intimate that narration in any form, even though given
during the time of the principal occurrences in question, may be excluded.
It is evident that if so strict a rule were consistently followed most spontaneous utterances would be entirely excluded. This case also follows
another element of the verbal act doctrine in its intimation that only principal actors' statements are so admissible, while the spontaneous exclamations of chance witnesses have generally been admitted if the other necessary guaranties of trustworthiness are present. Other cases following the
principal case in admitting statements of this kind when the· necessary elements of trustworthiness are present are: Louis v Ill. Cen. R. Co., 140 La. L;
Freemen v. Ins. Co., 195 S. W. 545; Daly v. Pr)w:. 197 Mo. App. 583, 1g8 S.
W. 91. For a full collection of cases of this type, see 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 918.
!NSURANCE-DSATH \VHILr: IN Mn.1TARY Sr:RVICE.-A life insurance policy provided, "If, within five years from the date of this policy, the insured
shal.l engage in military or vaval service in time of war, the liability of the
company, in event of the death of the insured while so engaged
shalt
be. limited to the return of the regular premium * * *" After the issuance
of the policy the insured was inducted: into military service under the provisions of the Selective Service Law, and died of pneumonia in a hospital
at Camp Taylor, Kentucky. In an action by his administrator to recover the
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face value of the policy, it was held, the company was not liable. Bradshaw
v. Farmers' and Bankers' Life Ins. Co. (Kans., 1920), 193 Pac. 332.
A life insurance policy contained this provision : "'!'his policy is incontestible after one year from date of issue * * *: Provided, however, that it
is especially understood and agreed that, in case of the death of the insured
while engaged in any military or naval service in time of war, the beneficiary"'
shall recover a sum equal to the total premiums paid', etc. The insured
enlisted in the naval service of the United States during the Great War, and
died of pneumonia while at his home on furlough shortly after the Armistice. In an action by his administrator, held, the company was liable for the
full amount of the policy. Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App., 1920),
225 S. W. lo6.
The problem of these cases is discussed and the cases reviewed in 18
MICH. L. Rtv. 686. See also Ibid. Sor. Since those notes several cases, in
addition to the principal cases, have been decided. Mattox v. New England
Mut: Life Ins. Co. (Ga. App., 1920), 103 S. E. l8o, where without discussion
of the point the court held the company not liable for the full amount;
Slaughter v. Protective League Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App., 1920), 223 S. W.
8rg, where recovery was limited to the premiums paid; Sandstedt v. Americati Cent. Life Ins. Co. (Wash., r920), 186 Pac. lOOg, where also the recovery
was limited, though the discussion was on another point. Apparently, the
co~flicting views of the Courts of Appeals i1JJ Missouri will be settled by the
Supreme Court of that state, for the Long case, supra, is certified to the
higher court.
lNSURANct--lNVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER OF INS~D BY B.ENF.FlCIARY
Dor:s NOT BAR RtcoV.ERY.-The beneficiary of a life insurance policy, through
his gross negligence, caused the death of the insured. In an action by the
beneficiary against the insurer, it was held that even though the plaintiff was
guilty of involuntary manslaughter under the Penal Code, that fact would
not defeat his action. Throop v Western Indemnity Co. (Cal., 1920), 193
Pac. 263.
It is contrary to public policy to permit a person who wilfully kills
another to enforce through the courts the contract for the payment of insurance upon the life of the person ki11ed. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Armstrong, n7 U. S. 591; Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., I52 N. C. I. See
24 HARV. L. Rtv. 227. The rule forbidding such recovery is analogous to
that prevailing in fire insurance, where the fire is set by the insured. 4
CooLtY ON INSURANCE, 3154 The reason given for the existence of the public policy is that to allow a recovery would furnish the party interested the
strongest temptation to bring about the event insured against and would
encourage crime. The killing in the present case was accidental, and as far
as the wording of the contract is concerned a recovery should be allowed.
There would, however, seem to be considerable room for argument whether
the same rule of public policy which operates in the case of a wilful killing
should not apply in the present case. Allowing the plaintiff to recover in
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this case places a premium upon gross negligence. The court madf! no mentiol'll of public policy in the principal case, nor did the Illinois court in the
case of Shreiner v. High Court of I. C. O. of F., 35 Ill. App. 576. In the
latter case the court said that a contract of insurance impliedly assumes the
risk of all carelessness. by every person, whether a possible beneficiary under
the contract or not; therefore, a death which is unintentional, though caused
by some neglect or unlawful act of the beneficiary, is within the contract,
and ought not to defeat the policy. See L. R A. 1917B, 1210.
JuDGts-PRovts10N FOR ExP£NS£S NO'.r INCR£AS£ oF CoMP£NS.\'.rlON.Where by statute the Missouri legislature allowed probate judges a certain sum for the payment of necessary expenses while engaged in holding
court, it was held that such allowance did not constitute additional "compensation" within the constitutional provision that the compensation of a public
officer should not be increased or diminished during his term of office.
Macon County v. Williams (Mo., 1920), 224 S. W. 835.
It seems to have been almost universally held that any allow~nce for
expenses incident to the discharge of the duties of office, in addition to the
salary provided by law, is not an increase of salary or compensation, a perquisite, nor an emolument of office, forbidden by the United States Constitution and the constitutions of practically all of the states. McCoy v. Handlin, 35 S. D. 487, 153 N. W. 361; Milwaukee County v. Halsey, 149 Wis. 82,
136 N. W. 139. The test of validity is: Was the purpose of the legislahtre
to increase the salary or was its purpose merely to save such salary, so (hat
the officer would, in fact, receive the whole thereof for the performance of
his official duties? The constitutional prohibition is aimed at the former
alone. It was framed in the public interest that the judiciary may be independent of the other departments, on the ground that, as Hamilton put it,
"A power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will" (F£nllRALIS'.r, No. 79). True, the power to allow or withhold sums for expenses
may give the legislature some hold on the judiciary, yet courts h~ve consistently confined the prohibition to increases or decreases of the compensation for services rendered, allowing the appropriation of special sums for
traveling and other incidental expenses of office. Such appropriations do
not add to the salary; they merely insure the official's full enjoyment of ir.
Kirkwood v. Soto, 87 Cal. 394. 25 Pac. 488; Smith v. Jackson, 241 Fed. 770
(approved, 246 U. S. 388, 62 L. Ed. 788); State v. Sheldon, 78 Neb. 552, 111
N. W. 372. Yet, in a recent case the United: States Supreme Court declared
that the prohibition was applicable both to direct and indirect changes in
salaries, and, reversing the lower court decision, held that the income tax
on the salaries of federal judges violated this constitutional provision. Evans
v. Gore (U. S. S. C., 1920), 64 L. Ed.-, 40 Sup. Ct. 550. It seems absurd
to say that while the allowance of expenses to judges does not violate
the provision, the taxation of the salaries of judges in common. with those
of other citizens does violate it. This tax is not such a diminution of
judges' salaries as to bring the judiciary within reach of the legislative
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department, nor would it cause any suspicion of influence that might tend
to shape their decisions, since the tax is on all "incomes from whatever
source derived." The judge's claim for salary is unimpaired; the amount
of income remains the same; the.deduction comes later when the government comes to collect taxes from all citizens, whatever be their position or
place. See 18 MICH. L. R£v. 6<.t;. The purpose of a constitutional provision
must guide courts in it& application, and it is submitted that if the independence of the judiciary is not tampered with by allowances for expenses it
certainly is not violated by a tax laid on all citizens alike. See dissenting
opinion in Evans v. Gore, supra.
LANDLORD AND T£NANT-MODt oF UTn.IZATION oF PR£:i.r1s£S-Co~sTauc
TION OF COV£NANT NOT TO Usr: FOR l:r.IMORAJ, PRACTI~s.-A lease contained
the covenant, "that the lessee will not keep or allow any hquor or beverages
of any intoxicating nature or tendency, kept or tolerated on said premises,
nor any gambling, or other immoral practices." The tenant used the premises as a book store and sold certain books of an immoral character. In an
action by the landlord in forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the trial court
found (F) that there had been a default in the payment of rent, and (:?)
that the premises had been used for immoral practices within the scope of
the covenant in the lease. A statute .empowered the tenant to reinstate his
rights under the lease by payment of the rent at any time before possession
was taken by the landlord under legal proceedings. Admitting the default
in payment of rent, it thus became necessary for the court to pass upon the
second finding in order to determine whether or not the tenant could exercise his statutory power. Held, in view of the lease describing the premises
as a book store, a prohibition on the kind cf books to be sold was not within
the contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution of the lease.
A construcition of the words, "or other immoral practices," in view of their
following directly after the specification of gambling or keeping of intoxicating liquors, must be confined to practices generally understood to be subversive to common decency, such as allowing the premises to be used as a
bawdy house or for lewd dancing. Paust v. Georgian (Minn., 1920), 179
N. W. 735.
Generally, the tenant is not restricted in the use of the leased premises
except by statute or express provision in the lease. Taylor v. Finnegan, 18g
Mass. 568, 76 N. E. 203; Heise v. Penn. Ry. Co., 62 Penn. 67. Where the
tenant is prohibited from ttsing the premises for certain specified trades or
any other noisome or offensive trade, such words as those italicized are construed as relating only to trades ejusdem generis with those which have
already been set out in particular in the covenant. Witherell v. Bird, 2 Ad'ot.
& E. 161; Jones v, Thorne, I Barn. & C. 715; I TIIIFANY, LAND. & T£N., §
123 d. There seems to be no reason why the same principle should not be
adhered to in the principal case; for it is self-evident that gambling is not
in the same category as the sate of certain immoral books which are among
those kept in a general stock in trade. ·
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Lma-PuBI.ICATION TO AGJ::NT.-Boltz and wife ordered a stove of the
defendant company, giving their joint note therefor. Young, an agent of
the stove company, was given the original order with the words "no good"
written across the face thereof, and directed not to deliver the stove unless
he could collect $57 which was not called for by the contract of sale. As
Boltz was working away from home, he asked a neighbor, Faulk, to assist
in receiving, unloading and placing the stove. Young showed the said order
to Faulk and to Mrs. Boltz, in explanation of his demand for the payment.
Held, it was unnecessary to decide whether the words were libelous per se,
for there was no publication. Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Boltz (Miss., 1920),
86 South. 354The court reasons that showing the alleged libelous words to the wife
was no publication, for she was jointly interested in the contract, and showing them to Faulk was no publication, for he was the agent of Boltz and
simply stood in his place. No authority was cited for either proposition.
The first, however, seems clear upon principle, but the second is more doubtful. Authority precisely in point is scarce. The statement that communication to any person other than the plaintiff is sufficient publication, SAI.MOND
ox ToRTs, 412; Jozsa v. Moroney, 125 La. 813, is too broad in the light of
many recent cases, some of which are cited, infra. But this is the rule, and
contrary cases are exceptions. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185,
is contrary to the principal case. The publication there consisted of the sale
of a newspaper to the agent of the plaintiff, sent purposely to make the purchase. Wright v. Great Northern R. R. Co., 186 S. W. 1o85 (Mo., 1916), is
also contra, but is without value here because placed by the court, unnecessarily, it seems, upon a special state statute. In Brown v. Elm City Lumber
Co., 167 N. C. 9, and Alabama & Vicksburg R.R. Co. v. Brooks, 69 Miss.
168, the sending of libelous letters to the plaintiffs' attorneys in response to
claims presented by the said attorneys for their respective clients, was held
sufficient publication. Dickinson v. Hathaway, 122 La. 644 also an attorney
case, seems contra to the two cases last cited, and to lend some support to
the principal case, but therein the matter of publication is badly confused
with that of privilege. Such a doctrine certainly finds no support in Jozsa
v. M oro11ey, supra. On principle, it is hard to see why the plaintiff was not
as much danmified by the exposure of the order to this particular neighbor
whom he had asked to help receive the stove as to any other person. The
temporary agency was neither prevention nor cure for the injury to his
reputation. The court in the instant case passes without notice another very
interesting question, to-wit, whether the handing of the libelous paper by
the company to their agent, Young, was not publication. On the authority
of Bacon v. MiclP. Central R. R. Co., 55 Mich • .224; Ward v. Smith, 6 Bing.
749; Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48; Pullman v. Hill [1891], 1 Q. B. 524,
and the numerous cases following the Pull1nan case, it is submitted that this
was publication. While the tendency is undoubtedly away from the Pullmall
case, as far as publication to a stenographer in the course of business is concerned, it is doubted if the court which gave the decision in Owen v. Ogilvie

MICHIGAN LAW REVlEW
Pub. Co., 32 App. Div. .¢5, and its many followers, would include a deliveryman of merchandise in their "all one act'' theory. See further I7 MICH. !,.
REV. I87, 346, and 19 MICH. L. Ri;:v. Io6, for the phase of the problem last
discussed above.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-RIGHT TO CONDEMN LAND FOR WATr.RWORKS
IN ANOTHER STATE.-The states of Washington and Oregon enacted recipro·
cal statutes providing that a municipal corporation of any adjoining state
might acquire title to land or water rights within the state by purchase or
condemnation for waterworks purposes. A city in Washington planned to
issue bonds to construct a waterworks system which required the city to
condemn lands in Oregon by virtue of the Oregon statute. A taxpayer
sought to- enjoin the issuance of the bonds on the ground that the city could
not exercise the power of eminent domain in another state and so could not
lawfully proceed with the project. Held (four justices dissenting), that in
view of the reciprocal statutes, the city may exercise the power of eminent
domain in the other state, and that the injunction should be reftised. La11gdon v. City of Walla Walla (Wash., I920), 193 Pac. I.
The right of eminent domain, by constitutional provisions which prevail
generally in the United States, is restricted to taking property for public use.
LEWIS, EMINENT DoMAIN, § I. The .public use for which property may be
taken is a public use within the state from which the power is derived. Generally speaking, one state cannot take or authorize the taking of property
situated within its limits for the use of another state. NICHOI.S, EMINENT
DoMAIN, § 29. If the state authorizing the use of the power benefits thereby,
it is no objection that another state also benefits. Gilmer v. Lime Point, I8
Cal. 229. The relative amount of direct benefit accruing inside and outside
of the state i5' not material. Thus, property was taken to be used to prevent
the water supply of two cities in the home state and one in a neighboring
state from being polluted. Columb11s Water Works Co. v. Long, I2I Ala.
245; and to increase the power of the condemner's electric plant located
within the state 4750 horse-power, and of its plant located outside of the
state I3,500 horse-power, Washington. Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho 595:
and to construct a pipe-line serving a few people in West Virginia and many
people in Pennsylvania, Carnegie Gas Co. v. Swiger, 72 W. Va. 557. It has
been held that unless some direct benefit from the proposed use is to accrue
to the state in which it is located, the state's power of eminent domain cannot be used to. condemn property. In Grover Irrigation Co. v. Lovella Ditch
Co., 2I Wyo. 204 the land sought to be condemned was to be used only to
facilitate the irrigation of land in another state; the use of the power was
refused. But indirect benefit to the state has also been recognized as sufficient to justify the exercise of the power. Thus, the United States was
permitted the state's right of eminent domain in Maryland for the purpose
of furnishing a water supply to the District of Columbia, the court basing
its decision. P!'-rtly on the ground that, as the United States benefited, Maryland as a part of the United States benefited also. Reddal! v. Bry'aii, I4 Md.
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444. And in fo re Thomas, 39 N. Y. 171, the right of eminent domain wa-;
exerted against land in New York to maintain a canal in New Jersey because
of the benefit to the people of New York, though the canal was situated
entirely in New Jersey; this benefit, a mere possibility, was that the people
of New York could use the canal, since it terminated on the Hudson river.
On the other hand, in the Grover irrigation Co. case, supra, although it was
pointed out that certain cities in Wyoming would benefit from the resulting
fertility of land in the neighborhood, the court considered this a111 indirect
benefit and refu~ed to allow the exercise of the eminent domain power for
such purpose. Thus, it appears that the requirement of benefit may be
applied from a strict or a liberal viewpoint. From a strict viewpoint, the
dissenting judges in the principal case are correct and the majority are not
in accord with the weight of authority, for the reciprocal statute is at best
only an indirect benefit to Oregon. But a treatment of the problem liberally,
from the standpoint of reasonableness and desirability, would be better.
From such a standpoirit the opinion of the majority is correct. In cases of
irrigation and water-rights a view has been taken broader than that of the
minority opinion. As long as Oregon, through its legislature, is willing to
permit a foreign municipality to use its power of eminent domain, and the
u;e of its land so acquired is a public one in the broad, liberal sense of the
word, no citizen of Washington should be heard to object.
Nu1sANO:-AIDlNG BF.TTING ON RAci;s !NDICTABLF..-D was indicted for
the offense of maintaining a common and public nuisance. The evidence
showed that he maintained a room in which he carried on a commission betting business. People would call him over the telephone and place bets with
him on horse races; he received their bets and transmitted them to his father
in New York, who would let him know if they were all right. They received
money by check from D's father in New York or transmitted money to his
New York office in case they lost the bet. There was no evidence of any
disturbance or noise in or about the office of D, and his place of business
was not known to the public generally. He was not indicted under the
statute relating to betting on horse racing, but under the common law for a
public nuisance. Held, he was guilty of maintaining a public nuisance by
aiding betting in violation of law. Enright v. Commonwealth (Ky., 1920), 225

s. w.

240.

The decision is undoubtedly correct and follows the general rule. At
common law any form of gambling was regarded as a nuisance because of
its tendency to corrupt morals, disturb the community, and ruin fortunes, and
it has been held that a pool room maintained to facilitate betting on horse
races is a common law nuisance. State v. Vaughn, 81 Ark. 117; State v.
Ayers, 49 Ore. 61. The decision in the principal case is based upon earlier
Kentucky decisions. In Ehrlick v. Commonwealtli, 125 Ky. 742, which was
a prosecution for maintaining a common nuisance (a pool room), the court
said: "A nuisance per se is any act or commission or use of property or thing
which is of itself hurtful to the health, tranquility, or morals, or outrages the
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decency of the community. It is not permissible or excusable under any
circumstances." fa James v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. Rep. 587, it is said that a
house or place kept for the purpose of enabling persons to place bets or
wagers upon horse races is a common gambling house, and is, therefore, a
nuisance per se. See also Jones v. State (Okla.), 132 Pac. 319- In the Ehrlick case, supra, the court also held that where the thing is per se a nuisance,
such as a pool room or gambling house, it is no defense that there was no
noise or disturbance, nor that the community was not disturbed by its presence. This is supported by authority, Kfog v. People, 83 N. Y. 587, where it
was held that it was not an essential element of the offense of keeping a
disorderly or gaming house that the public should be disturbed by the noise.
NmsANCE-ATTRACTIVr: Nu1sANC£-NEITHER CoFFER DAM NOR PoND Is.The Supreme Court of Iowa recently handed down two decisions on attrac·
tive nuisances. In the one case, a railroad maintained a coffer dam in support of one of the piers of its bridge. A beam extended entirely around the
dam. and the plaintiff's intestate (eight years old) was drowµed by the
water within the dam by losing his balance in an attempt to walk the beam.
In the other, the plaintiff's intestate (five years old) was drowned in a pond
that was allowed by the railroad to remain undrained on its right of way.
In both cases the plaintiff's right to recover was denied. Massing/tam v.
Illinois Central Ry. Co. (Iowa, I920),. I70 N. W. 832; Blough v. Chicago
Great Western R. Co. (Iowa, 1920), I79 N. W. 840.
The trend of the decisions points to a refusal by the courts to extend
the rule of attractive nuisance advanced in the turntable cases. 2 Coot.£Y,
TORTS [Ed. 3], I272, n. 43. For cases representative of this tendency, see
Ryan v. Towan, I28 Mich. 463 (water wheel); Sullivan v. Boston & Albany
R. Co., I56 Mass. 378 (charged wire on the roof of a shed) ; Rogers v. Lees,
140 Pa. St. 475 (hoisting apparatus); Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 214 (open
cellar); O'Connor v. Brucker, u7 Ga. 475 (open door of a vacant house);
Arnold v. St. Louis, I52 Mo. 173 (pond covered with ice). But see Comer
v. City of Wi11ston-Salem (N. C.. I9I9), 100 S. E. 619, I8 MrcH. L. R£v. 340,
where the city was held liable for failure to maintain a proper railing on its
bridge. See also Ramsay v. Tuthill Building Material Co. (Ill., I920), I29
N. E. 127, which arose over the death of a child smothered by sand in a
bin in which deceased was, playing.
NuISANCE-FUNERAI. HOME IN A Rr:SIDEN'tl.AI. Sr:CTION.-The defendants
bought a house in an exclusive residential section and commenced to use it
for the purpose of a funeral home in connection with their undertaking
establishment, which was situated in another part of the city. They constructed a driveway entirely around the house for the purpose of parking
funeral cars and carriages. The nature of the business required that bodies
should be allowed to remain there from twenty-four to thirty-six hours.
Services were held and funeral processions started from the home. The
effect of the establishment was to impair materially the value of the sur-
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rounding property. In a suit by residents of the neighborhood. held, that
although a funeral home is not a nuisance per se, under the circumstances
of this case it must be held to be such: and an injunction will issue to
restrain the use of the premises for that purpose. _l\feagller v. Kessler
(Minn., 1920), I79 N. W. 733.
The court places the funeral home in the same category as undertaking
establishments, which uniformly have been held not to be nuisances per se.
They become nuisances, however, when they are conducted in a residential
district, and where their effect is to impair thf\ enjoyment of the neighboring
premises and to decrease the value of the property in the neighborhood generally. There are but few cases on the subject, most of which are collected
in a note to Goodrich v. Starrett, 108 Wash. 437, I84 Pac. 220, in 18 MICH.
L. RE\'. 246. See also I9 MICH. L. Rr:v. III, commenting on Beisel v. Crosby
(Neb., 1920), 178 N. W. 272.
Rr:s !PSA loQUlTUR-RS.ATION TO BURDEN OF PROQF.-In an action for
negligent burning of timber on the plaintiff's land there was some evidence
that the fire originated from sparks emitted from one of the defendant's
engines. The court recognized that the case was a proper one for the application of the doctrine of res ispa loquitur, and in its instruction to the jury
imposed upon the defendant the burden of satisfying the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not negligent. Held, instruction erroneous. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not change the burden of proof,
but merely makes a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff and pl;ices on
the defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence. Page v.
Camp Mfg. Co. (N. C.. I920), 104 S. E. 66/'.
The court in the instant case correctly states what is now the prevailing
view as to the relation between the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the
burden of proof. The principle is applied where the circumstances of the
occurrence are such as to warrant the inference of negligence and makes it
incumbent upon the defendant to adduce evidence in rebuttal if he desires
to do so. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233; Kay v. M etropolita11 St. R)•. Co.,
163 N. Y. 447; Everett v. Foley, 132 Ill. App. 438. South Carolina supports
the view that the burden of proof ii> thereby shifted. Sullivan v. Charleston.
& W. C. R. Co., 85 S. C. 532. Instructions similar to those given in the
instant case were upheld in Atlantic Coast Lille R. Co. v. Jones, 132 Ga. I8g.
For many other cases approving similar instructions see note in L. R. A.
I9I6A 930. Even in many cases which recognize the theoretical sound'ness
of the rule that the burden of proof never shifts confusion has been introduced into the law in deciding whether or not given instructions are in conformity to the rule. This has been due to a misapprehension of the correct
meaning of the terms "burden of proof" and "preponderance of the evidence"
or to a loose employment of these terms. Furnish v. Mo. P.R. Co., I02 Mo.
438; Baum v. N. Y. Q. C. R. Co., I24 App. Div. I2; Abrams v. Seattle, 6o
Wash. 356; Carroll v. Boston Elev. R. Co., 200 Mass. 527. Some of these
courts have suggested that a loose or unscientific use of these terms will not

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

452

contuse the jury, and that therefore instructions to the effect that "the burden ot proof has shifted to the defendant" or "the defendant must prove by
.i preponderance of the evidence that he was not negligent" are not prejud1c1ally erroneous. But it would seem that if these terms have a well-defined
legal meaning, their correct use should be insisted upon, even at the risk of
reversal on what seem purely technical grounds. Such is the view of the
United States Supreme Court in Sweeney v. Erving, supra, which is approved
in the instant case. As to whether the presumption of negligence requires
or merely permits a verdict for the plaintiff if the defendant produces no
evidence in rebuttal, the decisions are not in harmony. See Sweet1ey v. Err1ing, s11pra, and Briglio v. Holt, 85 Wash. 155. See W1GMOR!>, par. 2509, for
rules governing the application of the doctrine of res ipsa lcquitur.
SI.ANDtR-"CRooK" NOT SI.ANDJ>Rous Pt& Ss.-It was alleged that defendant said of plaintiff, "Madame is a crook," and that the words imputed commission of crime involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment. Held,
the innuendo is not supported by reason or authority; that "crook" is applied
to persons who are not guilty of crime. and as no special damage is alleged
the cause is dismissed on demurrer. Villemin v. Brown, 184 N. Y. S. 570.
In the English courts and the majority of American courts it is the duty
of the court to determine whether the language used in the publication can
fairly or reasonably' be construed to have the meaning imputed, and if the
court determines it is capable of such construction it is then left to the jury
to decide in what sense the language was used. Hankinson v. Bilby, 16 M.
& W. 441; Slmbley v. Ashton, 130 Ia. 195; Downs v. Hawley, nz Mass. 237;
Langer v. Courier News, 179 N. W. 909- On the other hand, in some jurisdictions, including that of the principal case, when the words are free from
ambiguity or evidence tending to change their natural meaning, whether
they are slanderous or libellous per se or not is passed upon by the court as
a matter of law. Cooper v. Gt'eele-y, I Denio (N. Y.) 347 ~ More v. Betiett,
48 N. Y. 472; Pugh v. McCarty, 44 Ga. 383; Gottbehuet v. Hubachek, 36 Wis.
515; Gabe v. McGinnis, 68 Ind'. 538. Determined either as a matter of fact
or of law, it would seem that "crook" means a person liable to imprisonment
for crime. The court in the principal case apparently treats of "crook'' and
"crooked" as synonymous. This may havi: been a source of error. While
neither term is credited with a precise meaning, "crooked" commonly denotes
failure to abide by the prevailing morality, whereas "crook" is a term carrying greater opprobrium, and ordinarily suggests a person who gains a livelihood by committing felonies. The class of slanders per se is a rigid one,
but not without reason, and, as the principal case holds, whenever a plaintiff
has suffered actual damage he is always at liberty to show it and recover
for it.
Stl!ltltt RAILRoADs-CON'.l'RIIlU'.rORY NllGI.lG1':NO: IN FAU.ING To SroP

AND

Qui,:sr10N OF FACT.-Plaintiff, while crossing defendant's street rail-·
way track, was struck by a street car and severely injured. Plaintiff's auto-
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mobile was moving at a rate of two miles an hour and the street car \\"\5
approaching at a speed of thirty miles an hour. Defendant moved for a
peremptory instruction in its favor, contending that plaintiff's failure to
stop and look before crossing constituted contributory negligence, as a matter of law, which barred his right to recover. The court refused so to
instruct, and left the question of contributory negligence to the jury. Held,
that failure to stop and look does not constitute contributory negligence as
a matter of law, but is a question of fact for the jury. Washington Ry. &
Electric Co. v. Stuart (D. C., 1920) 26i Fed. 632.
The court, in this case, clearly draws the distinction between cases
involving steam railway crossings and those involving street railway crossings. The general rule in the case of steam railway crossings seems to be
that failure to stop, look and listen before crossing constitutes contributory
negligence as a matter of law. Koch v. Southern California R. R., 148 Cal.
677, and cases there cited; Haven v. Erie R. R., 41 N. Y. 2!)6; Northern
Pacific Ry. Ca; v. Freeman, 174 U. S. 379. In the principal case the court
points· out that no one has a. right to assume that a steam train or interurban
car, operated on the company's right of way, will be under control with a
view of stopping promptly if the safety of a pedestrian or other person crossing the track requires it. It also points out that street railway tracks are
necessarily to be crossed with great frequency, by reason of their occupancy
of public streets, and that the facility with which such cars are stopped and
the frequency of their stopping make the danger measurably less than that
incurred in crossing an ordinary railroad crossing. The weight of authority
seems to support the distinctions here drawn. Detroit United Ry. v. Nichols,
165 Fed. 289; City & Sub1trba1i R'!,•. Co. v. Cooper, 32 App. D. C. 550;
M cQuistm v. Detroit Street Ry., 148 Mich. 67.
TRIALS-MOTION FOR DIR£CTED V:ERDIC'l'-EFFECT OF MOTION BY BOTH

Sm:ES.-P sued D as assignee of X. D set up as a special defense that the
assignment was void because it was champertous. At the close of the testimany D moved for a directed verdict on the ground the evidence conclusively
showed champerty, and P. also moved for a directed verdict, with the proviso
that if the court ruled against them he be allowed to go to the jury upon the
facts. The court refused to accept the conditional motion and ordered P
to elect between going to the jury and moving for the directed verdict.
Under protest P moved: for a directed verdict, and then the court found· as
a fact that the assignment was champertous and rendered judgment for D.
Held, error, for where counsel makes it plain that he wishes to go to the
jury on a question of fact, a motion for a directed verdict by both sides does
not present the question of fact irrevocably to the court. Sampliner v. Motion
Pictllre Patents Co. (U. S., 1920). 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 79.
While it is true, as the trial court held, that a request by both sides for
directed verdict, by the great weight of authority, waives the right to trial
of the facts by the jury and submits them to the court, yet it does not follow
that the implication of waiver may not be rebutted by an express or implied
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denial of an intention to waive. Hatch v. Calhoun County, 170 Mich. 322;
St. Louis Railway v Mulkey, 100 Ark. 71, Ann. Cas. l913C I338. and note.
The trial court seems to have fallen into the same error which has deterred
minority courts from following the general rule on the ground that its adoption would provide a trap for the unwary and a penalty of a denial of trial
by jury upon a motion for directed verdict. Wolf v. Chicago Sign Co., 233
Ill. 501, 13 Ann. Cas. 36g, and note; Virginia-Tennessee Hardware Co. v.
Hodges, 126 Tenn. 370. One court at least has reached the minority rule as
a matter of logic and analysis of the effect of a motion for directed verdict,
saying that "one who claims that the evidence is all his way cannot reasonably be held to waive the right to claim that, at least, some of it is his way."
Fitzsimmons v. Richardsoti, 86 Vt. 229. That the minority courts have no
reason to refuse to follow the majority rule because of its danger is not only
shown conclusively by the decision of the court. in the principal case but
also by an unbroken line of decisions in courts following the majority rule.
Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison Ry., 2IO U. S. I, also note in 6 Ann,
Cas. 547; Pemistoti v. Coleman, 126 N. Y. S. 736. The power of counsel to
request a jury trial even after both parties have moved for directed verdicts
apparently should conclusively answer the objection.s to the general rule
given voice to in the Wolf and Hodges cases, supra.
VENDOR AND PURCHAS£R-AGRttl1UlNT TO CONVEY Fro:E FROM ENCUMBRANC£S AS APPI.1£» TO VISIBLE EASEMENTS.-Suit was brought by an executor to enforce specifically an agreement for the sale of land free from all
encumbrances. W defended on the ground that the plaintiff could not give
him a marketable title, since the land was subject to an easement of way
for electric wires carried upon huge steel towers. J!eld, no defense, for
vendee is presumed to have contracted to accept the land subject to encumbrances of an open and notorious nature. McCart~· v. Wilson (Cal., 1920),
193 Pac. 578.
The decision of the principal case rested largely upon another recent
California decision, Ferguson v. Edgar ( 1919), 178 Cal. 17, where it was held
that a vendee had no right to rescind a contract to purchase land free from
encumbrances, because of the existence of an irrigation ditch and canal upon
the land. This principal has been generally applied in cases involving a public
highway, Patterson v. Arthurs, 9 Watts (Pa.) 152, and especially in suits
upon covenants against encumbrances by the grantee of a warranty deed.
MAUPIN ON MARKETABLE TITL"lt, 304; Kellog v. Ingersoll, 2 Mass. 97, co11tra,and in one case at least it was held not an encumbrance within the meaning
of the covenant. even though the purchaser did not know of the existence
of the highway. Sandum v. Johnson, 122 Minn. 368, but this case is extreme.
As to ordinary private easements, the authorities are irreconcilably in conflict. The theory of one group of these cases seems to be that the mstrument being the grantor's, and having failed to put in an exception, he must
abide by his covenant as made, and knowledge by the grantee cannot have
the effect of qualifying a general covenant, since an article may be warranted
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to be sound when both parties know it to be unsound (Hubbard v. No1·ton,
10 Conn. 423; Beach v. Miller, SI Ill. 200) ; but the general rule is that a
general warranty does not cover defects which the buyer must have observed.
WILLISTON ON SALES, 207. In Haldane v. Sweet, SS Mich. 1g6, Cooley, J.,
laid down the rule that the existence of an alley which is visible is no e...._cuse
for failing to perform a contract to purchase land, in accordance with the
reasoning of the principal case. Kutz v. McCune, 22 Wis. 628; Smith v.
Hughes, so Wis. 620, accord. It is submitted that although the rule of the
principal case seems to be more calculated to do justice where urged as a
merely technical defense to a contract lawfully entered into, the opposite
rule is more logical, and not so dangerous to apply. See 30 L. R. A. N. S.
833 and 48 L. R. A. N. S. for a compilation of the authorities.
WILLS-TRUST NOT CREATED BY DIRECTION TO DISPOSE OF PROPER'!\" "AcTo Br:sT ]UDGMENT.''-A will directed the executor and another named
person "to divide and distribute the residue according to their best judgment." In a bill for a construction of the will, held, there was no trust,
express or implied, but an unqualified power of appointment which the court
could not control. Harvey v. Griggs (Del., r920), 111 Atl. 437.
There are two possibilities in such a case. First, the language may be
interpreted as an absolute power of disposition, uncontrollable by the court.
Second, it may be regarded as creating a trust which is void for indefiniteness, and there will be a resulting trust for the heirs or next of kin. In the
following cases no trust was implied: "to be at the disposal of his wife in
and by her last will and testament to whom she shall think fit and proper
to give the same," Robinson v. D1mgate, 2 Vern. r81; "to be disposed of unto
such person or persons * * * as they in their discretion shall think proper
and expedience," Gibbs v. Rumsey, 2 V. & B. 294; to executors to dispose of
"as they in their di;cretion shall think fit,'' Paice v. Archbishop of Canterbury, r4 Ves. Jr. 364; to be disposed of "as the trustee hereof for the time
being in the uncontrolled absolute discretion or pleasure of such trustee
shall see fit,'' Norman v. Prince, 40. R. I. 402. In the following cases a resulting trust for the heir& or next of kin was imposed: "Upon trust to * * *
dispose of the ultimate residue to such objects of benevolence and liberally
as the bishop * * * in his own discretion shall most approve oi,'' Morice v.
Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. Jr. 6s6; "in trust to expend solely for benevolent
purposes in their discretion;• Willets v. Willets, 103 N. Y. '5so; "in trust to
be distributed and disposed of a's he pleases," Haskell v. Staples, 116 Me.
103; "to such charitable, educational and scientific purposes as in your judgment will most substantially benefit mankind," Tilden v. . Green, 103 N. Y.
29. For many other cases see AMES, CASES ONT.RUSTS f20d Ed.], p. 93, note;
37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 400. Having determined in the instant case that the
e."<ecutor took an arbitrary power of disposition, the case is simple of solution. If he is willing to carry out the obvious intention of the testator, the
court cannot prevent him. Norman v. Prince. sllpra. But if it is clear that
the executor is not to take brneficially (courts have seized upon the words
CORDING
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"in trust'' or "to trustees" as controlling, though in Norman v. Prince, supra,
it is denied that they are significant), and that the trust is not charitable, the
fa1.1: that there is no beneficiary who can enforce the trust has caused most
courts to allow it to fail. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra. Where, however, the trustee is willing to act in such cases, there would seem to be no
reason for refusing to permit him to effectuate the intention of the testator.
Re Gibbon [1917], I I. R 448. For arguments on both sides of this question
see 5 HARV. L. R.l;v. 389 and 15 HARv. L. Ri>v. 509.
WORKMEN'S COMPSNSATION-ACCID!tNT ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMSNT-

SPORnVr: ACT oF Co-tMPLOYJ>£.-Where an employee while devoting his time
to his work was struck in the eye by an apple thrown by a fellow servant
engaged in horseplay, it was held that the injury was one "arising out of and
in the course of his employment,'' within the Workmen's Compensation Law.
Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills (N. Y., 1920), 128 N. E. 711.
The general rule under the English Workmen's Compensation Act is
that an employee who is injured while "larking" or while in the performance
of some sportive act cannot recover, for the reason that the injuries are not
regarded as arising out of the employment. Fitzgerald v. Clarke & Son
[1!)08], 2 K. B. 796; Wilso1~ v. Laing [1909], Court of Session, 1230; Wrigl.?y
v. Nasmyth, Wilson & Co. [1913], 'NV. C. & Ins. Rep. 145. To the same
effect are most of the American decisio~s. Thompson v. Emplo3•ers' Liability
Assur. Corp., Ltd., 2 Mass. W. C. C. 145; Matter of Stillwagon v. Callan
Bros., 224 N. Y. 71•4; In re Zelavzmi, 1 Ohio Ind. Comm. Bull. (No. 7) 87,
(No. 48427, 1914), 8 N. C. C. A. 286; Payne v. Industrial Comn. (Ill., 1920),
129 N'. E. 122. The reason for refusing the award is that the claimant has,
by himself engaging in the horseplay, suspended his work and temporarily
stepped outside his employment. The New Jersey court has gone even
farther by declaring that the employer is not liable for an injury due to
horseplay "whether the injured party instigated the occurrence or took
no part in it; for, while an accident happening in such circumstances may
arise in the course of, it cannot be said to arise out of, the employment."
Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. L. 161. To the same effect, see also the
two Michigan cases of In re Boelema. and Ratkowski v. Am. Car. & Foundry
Co., 5 N. C. C. A. 7<}3. The principal case, in drawing the line between
those cases in which the claimant did and those in which he did not take
part in the sportive acts which resulted in the injury, has the support of a
number of decisions, both American and English. Knopp v. Am. Car &
Foundry Co., 186 Ill. App. 6o5; Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Board, 277
Ill. 53;. In re Mack, I Ohio Ind. Comm. Bull. (No. 7) 120 (No. 37914, 1914);
Shaw v. Macfarlane, 52 Sc. L. R 236. The extension of the operation of
the Workmen's Compensation Acts to the latter class of cases may, perhaps,
be justified upon the ground that these statutes are remedial and should be
broadly interpreted. Moore v. Lehigh Valley R31• Co., 154 N. Y. S. 620. But,
even so, the reasoning in the principal case to the effect that the injury arises
out of the business because skylarking among the employees is "something
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reasonably to be expected" proves rather too much. Fo11owed to its logical
conclusion, this argument would destroy the very distinction sought to be
established, and would lead to a11owing the claim even in a case where the
injured employee was himself taking part in the sportive acts which resulted
in his injury. For a note on the general subject of accidents "arising out
of" employment, see 16 MxcH. L. REv. 179·
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Act-COMPENSATION FOR INJURY AGGRAVATING A LATENT D1sSAS1>.-P, an apparently able-bodied young man, in starting
a gas engine caught his foot, which was lacerated, and fell in faint. He
lost the use of hisi legs. Medical testimony showed he was suffering from
multiple sclerosis, hardening of the brain. Also that this disease was hereditary or caused by acute infection; that any shock or excitement would aggravate the disease and bring on the present condition of disability. In an action
for compensation, held, the injury precipitated the present condition of P
and is fully responsible therefor. P is entitled to compensation for total
incapacity for life. Blackburn v. Coffeyville Vitrified Brick and Tile Co,
(Kan., 1920), 193 Pac. 351.
The Compensation Acts, genera11y speaking, impose a liability on the
employer for any accidental injuries to his employees arising out of the
employment. HONNOLD, WoRKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 4- The question arises
as to what constitutes an accidental or personal injury within the meaning
of the acts. Often the incapacity from which the employee suffers or which
causes his death is the immediate result of a disease. Then the problem is
to determine whether the disease is to be considered as the proximate result
of an accident so as to make the Compensation Act applicable. In cases like
the principal case, where the disease from which the employee was suffering
or died was aggravated or accelerated by the accident, compensation is
awarded on the theory that the accident was the proximate cause of the
disability or death. Thus where an employee accidentally fe11, and testimony
showed that the injury aroused latent tuberculosis, accelerated the disease
and caused death earlier than otherwise, <:ompensation was given for death.
Retmier v. Cmse (Ind.), n9 N. E. 32; Van Keuren v. Dwight Divine &
Sons, 165 N. Y. Supp. 1049; see cases cited in 15 N. C. C. A. 632 and 17 N.
C. C. A. 864- The accident aggravating the disease may be undue excitement or strain in the course of employment. Thus, where a night watchman
died after the excitement of a fire in the plant, it was found he had a weak
heart. The court, in reversing the decision of the Accident Board denying
compensation. said: "The fact that the man's condition predisposed him to
such an accident or stroke must be, under the authorities, held to be immaterial. White the exertion and excitement which accelerated the heart action
were not the sole proximate cause of the death, they were certainly concurring causes. Schroetke v. Jackson-Church Co., 193 Mich. 616. So also,
where a miner who was pushing a coal car up a grade suddenly complained
of his side and died shortly, the evidence showing that his heart was diseased
and that the strain caused a rupture of the heart resulting in death, the court
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awarded compensation on the ground that the personal injury, the rupture
nf the heart. was by accident, as it hastened to a fatal end an ailment.
Indian Creek Coal Co. v. Calvert (Ind.), n9 N. E. 5I9. Death or incapacity
resulting from a non-occupational disease alone is not compensable. A
workman dying of apoplexy was denied compensation where there was neither
unusual happening nor accident. Guthrie v. Detroit Ship Co., 200 Mich. 355.
It appears that there must actually be an accident in order for an injury
aggravating a disease to be compensable. The compensation recoverable is
usually held to be for the total disability, not merely for that degree of the
disability which was caused by the accident as distinguished from that which
was caused by the disease. Indianapolis Abattoir Co. v. Colemaii (Ind.),
II7 N. E. 502. "The previous condition of health of the employee is of no
consequence in determining the amount of relief to be afforded * "" * [But]
it is only where there is a direct causal connection between the exertion of
the employment and the injury that an award of comp~sation can be made."
In re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, the court pointing out that where the disease
was the cause of the injury no award can be made, but where the employment was a proximate contributing cause to the injury there ought to be an
award made. The decision in the principal case appears to be in accord
with the authorities and the correct view. The theory of the Compensation
Acts is that every personal loss to an employee, as such, is an element of
the cost of production and should be 'charged to the industry. It is to protect the employee at the expense of the industry. Being social in its aim
and conception, and making no distinction in the condition of the health of
employees, the Act should compensate for the disability, even though the
injury is aggravated by or aggravates a congenital weakness or a preexisting
disease.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT--INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN CoURSE
EHPtoYMENT.-Leaving the works where she was employed during the
dinner hour, a machinist ·went to a canteen provided by her employers in
another part of the premises. Hurrying down a flight of stairs leading from
the canteen to the street which connected the canteen and the works, she
slipped and broke her ankle. Held (two of the five judges dissenting), the
injury arose out of and in the course of the employment, within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co. v.
Redford [1920], A. C. 757.
A workman's employment is not confined to the actual work upon which
he is engaged, but extends to those actions which by the terms of his employment he is entitled to take or where by such terms he is taking his me;ils
on the employer's premises. Brice v. Lloyd [1909), 2 K. B, 8o4; Friebel v.
Chicago City Ry. Co., 28o Ill. 76, II7 N. E. 467; Scott v. Payne Bros., 85 N.
J. L. 446, 8g Atl. 927. The period of employment is not necessarily broken
by mere intervals of leisure such as those taken for meals. In re Sundfae,
218 Mass. 1, 105 N. E. 433; HoNNor.n, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Sec. in.
As the court said in the instant case, "the taking of meats is a matter ancilOF

RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS

459

lary and incidental to the employment." Up to this point there is little conflict of opinion. Where the courts divide is as to what acts of the dining
employee are "within the contemplation of both parties to the contract as
necessarily incidental to it." Plainly, where the worker is in a forbidden
place or doing an obviously dangerous act during the lunch hour there can
be no recovery for any injuries he may receive. Brice v. Llosd, supra;
Manor v. Pennington, 180 App. Dh 130, 167 N. Y. Supp. 424; Weis Paper
Mill Co. v. Industrial Commission (Ill., 1920), 127 N. E. 732. Similarly, if
during the leisure hour a workman absented himself from the place of
employment for his own purposes there would be such an interruption of
the employment as to defeat a recovery of compensation for an injury during
such absence. Davidson v. M'Robb [1918], A. C. 304. On the one hand,
where the employee eats his lunch in the factory according to an established
custom and he is there injured, the mishap is said to be incidental to his
employment and a recovery is allowed. Racine Rubber Co. v. Industrial
Commissum, 165 Wis. 6oo, 162 N. W. 664. On the other hand, where the
accident occurs in a public street the courts are inclined to refuse a recovery,
unless it can be shown that the employee was in the street on the busines-,
of, or as a duty that he owed to, his employer. Bell v. Armstrong, 88 L. J.
K. B. 844. See in this connection 16 :l\11cH. L. Rr:v. 179. Between these two
extremes come injuries, such as that in the principal case, which occur 011
the employer's premises. In fo re S1111dine, supra, such an accident was held
to have arisen out of and
the course of the employment, although the.stairs
on which the employee slipped and was hurt were not under the employer's
control. The court said it was sufficient that they were on his premises. In
Highley v. Lancashire & Y. Rj•. Co., 85 L. J. K. ·B. 1513, a worker recovered
although the accident occurred on train tracks which workers used as a
"short cut" to the mess room, against the railway company's orders. In the
instant case the arbitrator found that the stairs were part of the premises
where the injured employee was employed, and where she would have no
right to be except by virtue of her employment. In this fact the majority of
the court found the element of causal relationship between the employment
and the accident necessary to allow a recovery under the A.ct. The rule
announced in the principal case seems to be in harmony with the trend of
modern authority on the point involved See BoYD. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Sec. 481; L. R. A. 191? A. 320; 6 A. L. R. n51 • See also 19 MICH. L.
Rev. 232.
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